If the pronouncement of a post--secular age has been productive for scholarship that unpacks secular discomforts, a point of departure for this essay is to trace the entanglement of the secular and the religious in its colonial incarnation to contribute to extant scholarship on secularism and the post--secular in the Indian context. I trace some of the contrapuntal debates on the secular and the post--secular that have significance for questions of co--existence within the Indian nation--state.
VOLUME18 NUMBER2 SEP2012 34 have always been and remain foreign to what this word names and arrests in its history'. 7 Derrida then makes a significant suggestion: 'the history of the word "religion" should in principle forbid every non--Christian from using the name "religion", in order to recognise in it what "we" would designate, identify and isolate there'. 8 In making this suggestion, Derrida echoes Talal Asad and Tomoko Masuzawa's arguments about the making of the category of religion as a universal. 9 Asad and Masuzawa's contrapuntal discussion of how religion is made through a study of European and non--European relationships gives substance to the ways in which the term 'religion' is a colonising discourse. 10 Contemporary European post--secular theory, Mandair argues, has seen a 'reversal' of its 'atheistic roots in the "masters of suspicion" (Marx, Nietzche, Freud)'. 11 'As a result', he suggests, 'theory has been used to legitimize the use of phenomena from Judeo--Christian traditions as resources not only for thinking critically about religion, but for thinking more critically about theory itself.' 12 For Mandair, these Judeo--Christian resources have been used, particularly by Alain Badiou, Gianni Vattimo and Slavoj Zizek, to re--energise critical theory and the European left. So, for example, Zizek's '"engaged political interventions" are primarily intended to reformulate a leftist anticapitalist political project in an era of global capitalism and its ideological supplement, liberal democratic multiculturalism'. 13 Yet, these approaches remain Eurocentric in that they refuse to reconsider other theological resources and, in doing so, repeat a colonial gesture where the activity of theorising itself can only be confined to the west.
On the other hand, postcolonial theory, Mandair argues, has suffered from a Saidian hangover, a directive transmitted via Marx, that the 'the criticism of religion is the premise of all criticism'. 14 
Mandair references Edward Said's The World, The
Text, The Critic which emphasised the need for secular criticism to counter the Orientalist construction of the non--West through ahistorical religious categories. 15 Following this directive, Mandair argues that 'most postcolonial theorists have treated the activity of thinking about religion as an oxymoron, thus forgetting that the activity of thinking (theory) and the work of religion--making have been inextricably connected in the history of Western thought and, of course, the colonial project'. 16 It is this refusal to take what is described as religion seriously that postcolonial theory consigns 'its own emancipatory project' to 'a kind of evolutionary historicism-the idea that whatever developed first in European modernity would inevitably follow later in the modernizing of the non--Western world'. 17 In order to understand this evolutionary historicism that Mandair refers to, I turn to the Indian context to examine debates about the (post) secular.
-THE INDIAN (POST) SECULAR
A brief glance at the connotations of Indian secularism suggests that something quite different from the Western meaning of separation of church and state emerges, even though such a separation, as Derrida has noted above, is impossible. Priya Kumar suggests that the complexity and slippages of the meanings of the secular in the Indian context are 'in excess of the western notion of separation of religious and political spheres'. 18 Secularism has meant neutrality or impartiality with regard to religion, but it has also been associated with 'tolerance of all religions' and has been VOLUME18 NUMBER2 SEP2012
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'made to serve the agenda of minority rights-to provide special treatment to marginalized religious groups'. 19 Paradoxically, 'the notion of tolerance, in its hegemonic versions, is articulated in the liberal and paternalistic idiom of the "protection of minorities"-both as a basis for state policy and as an ideal of peaceful coexistence in society'. 20 This notion of tolerance was also claimed by Gandhi for the broader traditions of Hinduism. Thus, secularism in this meaning has underwritten the ambiguities within Indian secularism and indicates its difference from the secular in Western contexts. These meanings of Indian secularism have been examined and debated through various theoretical and political positions since the 1990s, particularly since the rise of Hindu nationalist politics. 21 Contesting the value and utility of secularism to counter Hindu nationalism, communitarians like T.N. Madan and Ashis Nandy have critiqued Indian secularism as an elite Westernising project. 22 For these theorists, secularism as an ideology which seeks to keep religion apart from public and everyday life is alien to the Indian context and hence cannot be used as a resource in everyday life. A left liberal position is articulated by Rajeev Bhargava who has defended the tenets of secularism, especially its goal to protect minority rights, and argues for a political secularism that can take on the role of regulating an ethical co--existence. 23 Both positions, it is important to note, appear invested in countering the force of Hindu nationalism. Named as communitarians, Madan and Nandy have both argued that secularism as an elite project has exhausted its resources, that it is time to turn to Indian religious traditions to mobilise extant non--modern forms of tolerance.
Bhargava, on the other hand, argues for a rights--based secularism against what he terms the 'vulgar Gandhianism' of the communitarians. 24 This rights--based secularism, Bhargava suggests, is the best option for a 'politics of the common good' in a 'heterogeneous society' like India. 25 Mandair argues that this crisis of secularism in the Indian context has witnessed the emergence of another position. This position is identified by Mandair as following Said's imperative of 'rethinking secularism as a safeguard against the injustices of democracy defined by a majoritarian community'. 26 Yet, Mandair's main point of contention against this attempt to rethink secularism is that it continues the refusal to rethink the religious. 27 'religion, in these essays, as well as in the broader discourse that constitutes them, is primarily addressed in terms of historical explanation or a sociology of religion'. 28 In doing this, the authors suggest (they cite Derrida's 'Faith and Knowledge' essay), 'a commitment to Enlightenment values' which operates as a 'limit' to 'a critique of secularism'. 29 For Mandair, the 'religious/secularism opposition by way of reference to Derrida is a serious misreading', but beyond that, he argues, these theorists 'fail to see that secularism is as much a colonial imposition as religion'. 30 Kant's discussion of reason and religion, for whom 'the judeo--christian is seen as the religion of reason, de--transcendentalized into secularism', Spivak argues that this de--transcendentalisation is 'also a description of capturing and controlling the VOLUME18 NUMBER2 SEP2012 38 possibility of the transcendental as that which is worshipped'. 34 Furthermore, Spivak rereads secularism in its Judeo--Christian formulation and legitimation via Kant against its own reason or otherwise, as it were. She suggests that this project requires reason 'to be our ally'; 'there is no compromise on that one, it cannot be fetishised, as in the most common version of secularism, laundered judeo--christianity'. 35 This common version, often expressed through the concept of tolerance, allows the West to 'de--transcendentalize all other religions' while disavowing the 'religion--culture language' that 'governs your own idiom'. 36 This disavowal, Spivak suggests, leads to the liberal celebration of the separation of church and state and the distinctions between public and private. These liberal separations enable the avowal of the transcendental (faith and religious practice) as a private practice, but disavows the religio--secular idiom which governs the practice of secular governmentality. But these distinctions of church and state, public and private, Spivak argues, 'are too race--and class--specific and indeed gender specific to hold up a just world'. 37 If we take into account the specificities of historical inequities of class, race and gender (sexuality is very much a part of this list even though Spivak does not name it given its fraught relationship to discourses of both the religious and the secular), then liberal separations of church and state, public and private are not tenable. Thus an assertion of secularism that is based on the privatisation of religious practice does not address the historical inequities of race, class, gender or sexuality. This is where Spivak's rereading of the Kantian imperative to de--transcendentalise religion as reason becomes useful. Arguing for a de--transcendentalisation of religion so that we can 'acknowledge religio/culture as idiom rather than ground of belief', Spivak suggests a critical secular practice. 38 This practice involves undoing the binary between the transcendental (faith) and immanence (everyday religious practice). The detranscendentalisation of faith transfigured into religio involves thinking through co--existence. Spivak's call to detranscendentalise is made in the name of revisiting the concept of tolerance 'which flourishes best when religion is de--transcendentalized into something like linguistic competence'. 39 So, Spivak calls for a detranscendentalisation of the religio--secular, in order to think through an ethics of co--existence that appears to constitute a critical secularism. In doing so, Spivak echoes Geraldine Finn's call for de--trancendentalisation within feminist religious studies. 40 In effect, Spivak also appears to be arguing for a state secularism which needs to be much more competent in 'juridico--legal' terms to fulfill its secularist credentials-but this competence can only be gained by learning the languages of the other. So, for example, 'the task, Spivak suggests, 'is to find something like the "secular/transcendental binary" in the contexts (languages) that we work in' (she refers to concepts within Islam and Hinduism here). 41 What I find compelling about Spivak's rumination is precisely the attention to inequities of gender, class, race and sexuality fostered by a religio--secular idiom; this foregrounding, we need to remember, also contains the possibility of the decolonisation of the order--word religio. In this sense, Spivak Jewish cosmopolitanism' informs this problematic. 48 So, '"the Jew" of modern Western imagination is both the threat of particularism confronting the secularizing and universalizing state and the figure of universal exchange that serves as a marker for the uprootedness and abstraction of bourgeois culture'. 49 Faced with this paradox of particularity and cosmopolitanism (in an identity that unsettles the abstract notion of the citizen, that is raced and religious and exceeds national borders), the European nation--state attempted to offer solutions to the Jewish problem, namely: '"uniform" citizenship, religious "tolerance", secular "national" literature and culture'. 50 Yet, these solutions produce a minoritisation of otherness.
It is this structure of minoritisation that is common to the forms of sovereignty that include European secular state sovereignty as well as a secular Indian state sovereignty even as historical differences illustrate the differences in the debate. In this sense, there is something machinic about the structure of state sovereignty as it attempts to resolve the issue of the otherness of religious identity within the political discourse of liberalism. Yet, the reterritorialisation of this minoritisation produces a distinct set of problems in the South Asian context. For Mufti, the majority/minority axis referenced by Indian secular criticism hinders its attempts to rethink the secular. So, Mufti argues, what theorists of nationalism in the Indian context have failed to recognise is that rather than 'a great settling of peoples' the 'distinguishing mark' of secular nationalism is that 'it makes large numbers of people eminently unsettled'. 51 So, one can say, the minoritisation of Muslims, Sikhs and Christians produces an unsettling effect for these religious identities. Thus, Mufti argues that the 'crisis of secularism' in the Indian context must 'be examined from the point of view, and at the site of minority existence'. 52 Mufti's discussion of the structure of minoritisation is a critique of Partha Chatterjee's discussion of secularism. 53 Drawing on a Foucauldian model of power and governmentality, Chatterjee has attempted to theorise the assertion of 'minority group demands' for 'cultural right' as something that is made 'in the language of rights'. 54 But these demands test the 'limit of liberal--rationalist theory' because a 'collective cultural right' is asserted which also is a 'right not to offer a reason for being different'. 55 However, Chatterjee argues, minority demands are made in the language of rights precisely because, for minority groups, the demands are 'a contestation on the ground of sovereignty that the right is asserted against governmentality '. 56 For Chatterjee, the solution to the issue of minority rights, especially when it comes to women's rights in the Indian context given the history of personal laws, is not secular state intervention. 57 Rather, Chatterjee visualises an advocate for minority rights who has to engage in a two--fold struggle, 'resist homogenization from the outside, and push for democratization inside' which 'would be a strategic politics of toleration'. 58 Yet, as Mufti has pointed out, Chatterjee's formulation of 'the minority subject's refusal to give reasons for his or her difference in no way alters the structure within which the minority is cast as the site of unreason'; 'reason is subsumed entirely within the life of the state. It also leaves intact the externality of minority to the nation--state.' 59 In subsequent essays, both Gyan Prakash and Gyan Pandey have also critiqued the persistence of the majority/minority formulation in Chatterjee's revisions of his earlier essay on secularism. 60 Even though Chatterjee argues for a re--examination of secularism from a minority position, Gyan Prakash, for example, argues that 'secularism cannot simply reassert the case for "tolerance", for that merely reaffirms the minoritization of Muslims'. 61 Gyan Pandey argues that since the rise of Hindu nationalism, 'what we have in India today is an intolerance not so much of particular religious practices or beliefs as of the simple fact of existence of people belonging to other religious denominations'. 62 Thus, it is the question of religious identity rather than practice that he suggests attends the 'new politics of violence that comes with this intolerance'. 63 For Pandey, the response to such a politics of violence is to question the majority/minority axis and to 'celebrate a new society of multiple minorities'. 64 Such a formulation requires unyoking the 'state' and 'nation' so that 'the state does not cover up its own particular interests (and the interests of the ruling classes and factions) as the interests of the sacred community called the nation'. 65 Yet Priya Kumar has suggested that it is hard to envision 'how such delinking of (majoritarian) nationalism from the state is to be achieved in political terms'. 66 Kumar argues that 'the very notion of Hindutva is premised on the idea of coerced cultural assimilation', so the counter--argument of secularist debates which focus on the protection of minority rights is inadequate if the state itself produces minoritisation. 67 'Understanding religiocultural "differences" not as essentialized VOLUME18 NUMBER2 SEP2012 42 preexisting identities, but as forms of exclusions engendered by nationalism and the modern state', Kumar states, 'will enable us to move past the multiculturalist paradigm of a "politics of difference"-to think instead in terms of power sharing and equality within the form of the nation--state'. 68 For Kumar, the answer is a 'redistribution of power and political participation'. 69 The redistribution of power would, in a sense, redress some of the production of minoritisation; however, claims for rights still need to be made through a minority identity. So, she states, 'the aporia of a minority rights discourse remains-mobilizing notions of a distinct, often bounded, cultural identity in order to stake its claims, this discourse risks fixing identities, besides denying ambiguities within the group'. 70 For Nivedita Menon, the issue of identity is paramount in thinking through an anti--Hindutva politics. But a radical politics, she suggests, must confront the populist arguments that Hindutva leaders make in relation to identities which are minoritised rather than a rethinking of the secular only in academic terms as arguments made to state institutions. If Hindutva leaders such as L.K. Advani whip up a fear of conversions that will reduce Hindus to a minority status, Menon argues that the tactic is not to 'deflect the fear' but to 'confront it'. 71 So, she suggests, 'we need to ask another, more aggressive question of our own instead-so what if Hindus become a minority one hundred years from now', 'our argument should be about ensuring democratic institutions such that it will make no difference to your status no matter the size of your community of birth'. 72 For Menon, the question of conversions for Hindutva organisations is not about religion, but about the majority/minority preoccupation. If this is so, she suggests, we need to ask why 'religious conversion' is seen as 'essentially different, in a democracy, from other kinds of conversion' such as when 'political parties attempt to convert voters by wild promises' or 'when political ideologies' of 'Marxists, of feminists or of the Hindu right-attempt to convert with promises of redemption and threats of various kinds, both material and spiritual'. 73 So for Menon, the majority/minority axis common to both religious and secular state nationalism can, through a radical politics, be questioned and confronted. Such a move would destabilise the categories of majority and minority.
Both Kumar and Menon suggest that the project of rethinking secularism must take into account a concept of living with otherness or other identities though their arguments take different directions. Kumar suggests that 'state secularism can only work to restrain or contain religious violence'. 74 So, 'the task before us', Kumar suggests, 'is not just how we can live together with some degree of civility, but how can we live together well'. 75 Living together well, Kumar argues (drawing on the Derridean notion of living well together), requires taking the question of co--existence 'outside the realm of the state where it is most debated'. 76 For Kumar, the secular in the Indian context has been burdened with too much of an expectation to provide solutions to the issue of coexistence. So, she suggests, 'secularism cannot take on the burden of ethical ways of relating to otherness even if it has become imbricated with the language of tolerance among Indian elites'. 77 In this sense, Kumar refers to Nandy's proposal that tolerance must be reactivated within the 'conceptual domain of the religious' even though she disagrees with Nandy in his rejection of 'Enlightenment secularism altogether'. 78 For Kumar, therefore, the concept of secularism is an important element of the coexistence, yet it is not 'the only mantra for envisioning a violence--free society'. 79 Tolerance, however, cannot be dissociated from power and governmentality, as Wendy Brown has pointed out. 80 In this regard, the recourse to Nandy's recovery of religious tolerance appears to be lodged within a majoritarian politics.
Menon, on the other hand, does not take the route of discussing living well together; rather, she focuses on the relationship between secularism and communalism. She suggests that 'living with secularism' in the current political climate is 'something that is ongoing, rather than something which has been achieved', something that 'will always be, in the process of becoming'. 81 What this means, Menon argues, is that 'to live with "secularism" is to live with "communalism"'; in other words, 'to live with secularism is to recognise its implication in statist and authoritarian discourses and to unhinge it, twist and turn it, to rework it into our everyday practices'. 82 For Menon, the issue of recognising the implications of secularism and communalism goes beyond the politics of the nation. 
